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In several  transitional  socialist  economies  the financial  system
is in danger  of becoming  part of a shell  game to hide  the losses
of the "real" economy. Rapid, successful  economic reform
requires  putting the shell game to an end.
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In the late 1980s, transitional socialist economies  efficient, helping in the retooling of existing
(TSEs) in Central and Eastem Europe were only  firms and the contruction of new ones, building
somewhat more sophisticated than shell money  the banks' institutional capability for commercial
systems: savings bobks or currency had to be  lending (including improving the banks' moni-
used for most transactions and there was no risk  toring capability and skills in assessing risk and
assessment, information monitoring and acquisi-  credit), and cleaning up the heavy arrears in
fion, or portfolio management. The TSEs have  debts between enterprises.
moved toward a two-tiered banking system (at
different speeds), but they lag in the develop-  Caprio and Levine contend that the banks
ment of competitive, market-based financial  should be "cleaned up" when they are privatized,
systems. In several TSEs the financial system  to prevent the quick reemergence of debt prob-
seems to be part of a shell game to hide the  lems. They believe that either of the proposed
losses of the "real" economy.  altematives for shaping financial systems in the
TSEs - very highly capitalized banking or
Caprio and Levine argue that rapid, success-  narrow banking - would minimize the need for
ful economic reform requires putting the shell  future support  L  hler  altemative would reduce
game to an end. They review several contentious  leverage in the TSEs and provide more financial
issues of financial reform in the TSEs, especially  stability.
issues involving macrofinance, corporate fi-
nance, the internal debt problem, and the need to  But taking concems about moral hazard to
build efficient banks.  an extreme - prohibiting debt finance - could
starve new firms for credit and limit economic
Key problems in the financial sector are  growth.  And without healthy growth, the
achieving some flexibility with interest rates,  reform-oriented resolve of TSEs resolve may
making the financial system competitive and  wane.
The  Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series  disserninates  the  fndings  of work  under  way  in  the  Bank.  An objectiveof  the series
is to get these  findings  out quicldy,  even if presentations  are less than fully polished.  The findings,  interpretations,  and
conclusions  in these  papers  do not necessarily  represent  official  Bank  policy.
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At present the Transitional  Socialist  Economies  (ITSEs)  in Eastern Europe  are at various
stages in the evolution  toward becoming  market-based  economies. In tM.e  late 1980s,  financial systems
in TSEs were only somewhat  more sophisticated  than shell money systems: savings books or currency
had to be used for most transactions, and other features of and skills associated  with modem financial
systems  - such as risk assessment,  monitoring,  information  acquisition,  and portfolio  management  -- were
absent.  Now, the TSEs generally have moved to a two-tiered banking system, but they have not yet
developed competitive, market-based  financial systems and are reforming at different speeds.'  Since
countries are at different stages of financial sector reform and economic development, reforming at
different speeds, and ultimately  may be seeking  different financial structures, there is not one "solution
to" or 'sequence for" reforming the financial  sector.  Moreover, internal and external advisers remain
divided over how to encourage the development  of a financial system that effectively mobilizes and
allocates resources, so that the financial system can (1) contribute  to the transformation  of inefficient
enterprises to internationally  competitive  companies  and (2) foster the development  of new, privately
owned firms.  Indeed, in st;veral  TSEs the financial  system appears  as part of a shell game to hide the
losses of the "real" economy. This paper reviews briefly several contentious  issues  for financial  sector
reform in the TSEs, and argues that putting the shell game to an end is necessary  for more rapid and
successful  economic  reform.
Before listing the issues analyzed in  this  paper, it  is important to  mention three
assumptions  inherent in our study. First, we take as given that the TSEs in Central and Eastern Europe
have decided to  move toward a  privately-owned,  free market system based on  existing economic
structures in Western Europe and the United States, in part due to  a reaction against government
interference.  Second, we assume that the countries have already adopted significant  price and trade
liberalization  policies, so that. notwithstanding  monopoly  problems, reasonable  price signals exist  or are
appearing to guide resource allocation. 2 Third, we believe  that the financial and enterprise sectors are
'Albania is ex,;ected  to move to a two-tiered  system  in the spring  of 1992.  In Czechoslovakia,  Romania,  and Bulgaria
over 98% of the banking sector is state-controlled  (measured  by bank assets, admittedly  a tenuous  indicator), while  in
Hungary, where reforms  began in the mid-1980s.  the comparable  figure is less than 70%.  In terms of privatizing  existing
banks, Czechoslovakia  is planning  to move quickly  and privatize  much of the banking sector early in 1992, while many
other countries  are still formulating  plans to privatize  existing  banks.
21f prices are still grossly different from world prices, fmanciai  sector reforms may intensify  the financing  of sectors not
viable in the long-run.2
inextricably  linked and that, therefore, appropriate  reforms in the financial sector are inseparable  from
reform in the enterprise sector, which is in turn inseparable  from price and trade liberalization. For
example, the form and speed of enterprise privatization  importantly  affects the apprepriate types and
sequencing  of financial  sector reforms, while the speed and scope of trade and price liberalization  may
influence  enterprise restructuring  and privatization.
The issues that we address fall under four broad headings: macro-finance, corporate
finance, the internal debt problem, and building  efficient  banks.  By "macro-finance,"  we refer to both
the role of the financial sector and the implications of financial sector reformsq  in maintaining and
promoting  macroeconomic  stability. The section  on 'corporate finance" covers policies toward financial
markets that have direct implications  for financing  the re-tooling of existing firms and the construction
of new ones, including  the breadth of activities in which the government  permits banks to engage. "The
internal  debt problem"  refers to the current  situation  in many  TSEs where enterprises  are unable  to satisfy
debt obligations  incurred under socialism, thereby creating a variety of problems for the financial and
enterprise sectors. We address various financial  sector policies that may be used to mitigate  the intemal
debt problem and minimize the probability of future such problems.  Finally, we discuss a  wide
assortment of issues dealing with "building  more efficient banks."  Here we focus on changes in the
structure of bank ownership, managerial incentives,  bank restructuring, the role of foreign banks, and
creating  an enabling  environment  for new financial  intermediaries  to arise  and function  effectively. Some
of this section deals with coping with the "heritage  problem," i.e., policy makers must design reforms
that fully recognize that existing institutions have inherited a stock of old debts, old managers, old
institutional  capihu, and old business and political relationships?
To limit the length and scope of this paper, we only briefly mention some of the most
important  and fundamental  issues  associated  with reforming  the financial  sector. Thus, we take as given  -
or address only cursorily  - some institutional  pre-requisites  for a well-functioning  financial  system that
in many cases are not fully satisfied. We do this to focus on what we believe are the most contentious
issues. For example, we do not study in depth the:
'Tbe  paper broaches  a fifth  issue - human resource  development  - not because  of a lack of agreement  on its role but
rather because  outsiders  seem to be underestimating  the scope  of the problem  and the magnitude  and type of technical
assistance  needed.3
i)  Development  of
*  Accounting  and auditing systems,
*  Payment  systems,
*  Human  resources,
*  Prudential  regulations,
*  Legal institutions,  or
ii)  Provision  of 'specialized" finance to sectors such as agriculture and housing.
Although  each of these issues is important  in financial  sector development,  substantial agreement  exists
on the "first-order"  aspects of these issues, even though differences  persist at the implementation  level.
Nonetheless,  it must be emphasized  that financial  sector reform in TSEs must involve the strengthening
of  legal and  -egulatory institutions, improvements in  the accounting and  payments systems, and
enhancements  in the financial  skills of the work force.
Parts II - VI lay out some key issues in reforming the financial sectors of  TSEs,
concluding notes are made in part VII, and the appendix briefly ieviews where the TSEs in Eastrnx
Europe stand in financial  sector reform.  The analysis raises some cautionary flags regarding certain
strategies while giving qualified green lights for other approaches.  We argue that there are two
potentially fruitful approaches to  financial sector reform, taking account of the exceedingly risky
environments  in which TSE financial institutions will operate for several years to come.  The first
alternative  would  be to allow  private banks with broad powers. but. recognizing  that the government  may
find it difficult  not to rescue depositors. calls for high upital  ratios well above those recommended  by
the BIS.4 A second nossibility  - the so-called narrow bank approach  - would allow any institution  to
call itself a bank if it took deposits and invested  funds only in short-term  and secure  instruments 5 Other
institutions  could  take deposits, make loans or take equity  positions, acting like universal banks in fact,
but would  be explicidy  excluded  from government  provided  deposit  insurance. A combination  of the two
approaches, in  which capital requirements and portfolio choices would be  tiered according to  the
proximity  to the payments  system, could be attempted, where the supervisory  system has attained some
Thb  issue of privatizing  existing  banks is left to Levine-Scott  (1992).
'For more  on narfow banks, se  Lawrence  (1985), Lawrence  and Talky (1978),  and Litan (1987.4
sophistication. Any of these options would limit the supply of debt finance, compared with a "wildcat
banking" extreme, perhaps leading to more stable firms.
Furthermore. we argue that the two extreme approaches  to bank privatization  - eit*er
rrivatize all of the state banks or none of them --  ae  strategicaIly  and economically  unwise! We deem
it important  to start the privatization  process, as incentives  matter as much in this sector as in any other.
Privatization  of the financial  sector does not have to be "all-or-nothing,"  especially  if the all-or-nothing
condition delays privatization. Moreover, a "big-bang"  privatization  of banks could be disastrous; in
countries  with explicit  or implicit  government  deposit  insurance,  rapid  large scale privatization  could  over
burden existing regulatory and supervisory capabilities  and lead to a financial crisis that impedes  the
entire reform program. Thus, we recommend  that countries  begin the privatization  process as soon as
possible and coordinate  this process with the establishment  of regulatory capabilities  and imposition  of
sensible  capital requirements  (in line with the powers  granted to banks).  Also, we would advise against
attempts to privatize banks before cleaning up pre-existing losses.  Economic efficiency, government
credibility, and social fairness -- especially if domestic residents are wiiiing purchasers - suggest a
portfolio  clean up on the eve of privatization.
We believe  that it is both important  and useful to consider  the consolidated  balance  sheet
of the government, i.e., the balance  sheet that includes  state-owned  enterprises  and state-owned  banks.
Not only is it misleading  to consider  the government  fiscal budget independently  of state-owned  banks
and enterprise, but this isolated  view can lead  to misguided  and counterproductive  policies. Specifically,
loss-making  firms that remain open must cover their losses through credit from the banking system,
budget  subsidies  or arrears on taxes, or interfirm  credits/arrears. In any of these cases, the government
(defined  appropriately  broadly) is incurring losses, and these losses should be explicitly  recognized,  not
"hidden" in bank or inter-enterprise  accounts. Allowing either the banks or firms to make loans that
cannot  be repaid merely defers a government  obligation. Since  deferral likely raises the cost of 1ealing
with problem firms. a program to cut losses now, through explicit provision of budget support both to
keep some firms open ard to close others down immediately  is preferred.  Explicit  recognition  of these
costs may call into question other aspects of reform programs, such as the pace of trade and price
liberalization  and/or the appropriateness  of the exchange  rate.  We realize that it is exceedingly  difficult
to value accurately  the assets  of the consolidated  budget and that "truth in budgeting"  will be difficult tosell, particularly given the political costs to ending  the shell game.  We stress, however, that exposing
and explicitly  addressing  the losses will increase  the odds of real sector gains.
Latly..  we argue that the scop)e  for te,chnical  as-sistance  that-will  have a high paygfzia
irnmmnse.  Long term secondment  of skilled professionals  should form the focal point in this effort, on
a scale unprecedented in financial sector work.  The current supply-driven  provision of technical
assistance in TSEs risks producing a hodgepodge  of approaches to financial sector development  and
regulation, and we expect that only the on-site presence of  advisers can help sort out consistent
recommendations  for individual  countries.
I.  Macro-Financial  Policy
The state of the financial sector is important  to the implementation  of macroeconomic
policy, and financial  sector reforms can importantly  influence  the macroeconomic  environment. This
section  discusses  three aspects  of the linkages  between  financial  structure and financial  sector reforms on
the one hand and macroeconomic  developments  and macroeconomic  policy implementation  on the other.
We first discuss fiscal policy. Current and future government  budgetary requirements  are mounting  in
many TSEs as governments  confront financial  sector problems  by explicitly  assuming responsibility  for
some bank loans, guaranteeing  new loans both to bolster bank balance sheets and aid state enterprises,
and promising  to satisfy unfunded  pension liabilities. We next discuss the implementation  of monetary
policy and analyze  mechanisms  for developing  better methods  than the rigid bank-by-bank  credit ceilings
used in most TSEs.  Finally, we analyze  the ties between  policies toward interest rate determination  and
the macroeconomy.  Although we assume that the objective is  market-determined interest rates,
experience  suggests  that during the transition  to a market-based  economy  some interest rate controls  may
be beneficial  in terms of macroeconomic  stability  and microeconomic  efficiency.6
A.  Fiscal and Quasi-Piscal  Deficits
Macroeconomic  stability  in TSEs will de )end  a great deal on how governments  respond
to fiscal  pressures  trom a variety  of sources. In addition  to traditional  expenditure  and taxation  pressures,
TSE governments  also are confronted  by substantial  uncovered  actual  or contingent  liabilities  of the public
sector, which often are discussed under the heading of "quasi-fiscal' activities.  Prominent examples
include  large foreign  exchange  debts (Yugoslavia,  Poland, and Hungary),  bad debts of commercial  banks
(too numerous to be delineated), unfunded  pension liabilities, and government guarantees for loans to
large state enterprises.  Whenever the govermnent makes a  "promise  to pay" and does not fund this
position, it adds to pressures eventually  to default, seek budgetary savings elsewhere, or monetize  the
debt.  When the activ.ties are on-budget, or in a separate fund, the situation is transparent: interest
payments  will have to be financed, and eventually  principal  repaid. However, when these items  - most
often foreign debt and bad commercial  loans  - are on the central bank's balance  sheet,  problems  may
be disguised,  especially  when inflation  and high interest  rates help produce  nominal  profits for tne central
bank, even though foreign exchange losses or bad domestic currency loans may leave its net worth
negative.'
As explicit  or quasi-fiscal  revenue  requirements  rise, there will be important  implications
for the financial  system.  While a well-functioning  government  securities market could help smooth the
time-path  of marginal taxes, inflationary  finance combined  with rigid interest rate policy could create
distortions  that adversely affect financial sector development. Thus, financial sector policies must be
aligned with fiscal financing decisions. Furthermore, revenue requirements  may encourage explicit or
implicit  taxes on financial  market activities  that impede  financial  market development. While all sectors
will have  to bear the costs of adjustment,  the financial  sector is a ready target for revenue  raising. These
taxes should  be explicitly  compared  with alternative  revenue  options since  restrictions on financial  sector
development  may slow structural adjustment  and stymie  economic  growth.  Driving residents  out of the
financial  system may entail  costs in the future, as it often proves difficult  to win back public confidence.
As seen in Figure 1, the decline in broad money, relative to GDP, in Bulgaria, Poland, and Romania
already has been quite large, and there is no clear evidence  of any remaining monetary overhang, as
As  Rocha  (1991)  notes, notwithstanding  negative  net wonh, the central bank may still  pay part of its nominal  profits
over to the budget.Figure  1
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monetary depth is about at or below what would be expected for countries of equivalent  per caPita
incomes. Thus the authorities  might want to look elsewhere  for tax revenue.
Recognition  of the liabilities  associated  with enterprise  and financial  reform and avoidance
of attempts  to bury them in the central banks' balance  sheets is important;  equally crucial, governments
should not issue an excessive quantity of loan guarantees to state enterprises.  Additionally, large
unfunded  pension  liabilities  dmand a reexamination  of both eligibility  and contribution  rates, and suggest
added impetus  to stwnulate  the development  of contractual  savings inst.tutions. Simply  put, ending  the
shell game (moving  losses aroune in an effort to hide them) may help focus atteistion  on the causes of
the losses and a re-examination  of governmtnt commitments.
At some stage in the reform process, most TSEs face large interfirm  arrears that sooner
or later have to be addressed by government. These arrears typically reflect a combination  of restraint
on bank credit and outright budget  subsidies,  combined  with an unwillingness  to close or scale bacd 'oss-
making  firms.  Arrears are likely in most TSEs because  of the absence  of any ownership control at the
firm level, together with poorly defined, if any, bankruptcy  proceedings.  Arrears are often the least
efficient  form of credit, as they represent  loans created  at will by borrowers, and can only be prevented
by suppliers demanding  payment (in casht  or kind) at delivery.  And the arrears typically do not net to
zero: firms with negative  value added  -- those using  resources to produce  output  that is virtually  unsalable
- use arrears to cover their losses, with little hope of ever repaying. As in Romania in 1991, the arrears
can cumulate to the point that they threaten to wipe out the better firms, and then necessitate their
assumption  by the government. Ending  arrears. without  disciplining  firms that cannot  cover  their variable
costs. will lead to some other manifestation  of the losses: the shell game will continue, with the ojy
uncertaij  b?ing the net  location of the losses., To avoid the shell game and improve the efficient
operation  of banks and enterprises, governments  should  explicitly  finance loss making state-owned  firms
that the government has chosen to keep afloat and not force banks or other enterprises to finance the
losses.
Shutting  down firms will force authorities  to cover unemployment  and any retraining
costs, while open loss-making  firms will require subsidies to remain afloat.  Figure 2 shows some
scenarios  for explicitly  covering these transition  costs under simple assumptions  about the percentage  of
"underwater firms" (those not covering variable costs under rational prices), the wage bill, and theFigure 2
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reolacerment  rate (fraction of wages replaced by unemployment  benefits). Specifically, we assume that
the wage bill equals 60% of GDP, a rough figure for many industrial economies  and that replacement
ratios are high (60% - 80% of average wages, as Is presently the case in Eastern Europe). Three cases
are considered:  in case 1, *only" 10%  of workers are laid off (or subsidies  are paid equal to what woild
have been paid had the plant in question  been closed 7) and the replacement  ratio is 60%, presently at the
low end of the range in TSEs.  Case two assumes a higher fraction of underwater firms, but with the
same replacement  ratio, while  the final case pairs this higher fraction with a high replacement  rate.  The
resulting  budget  deficits (4% to 10%  of GDP) would occur ik All other budget  commitments  are covered
by revenues and if  governments continue to offer generous replacement ratios for  unemployment
compensation. Deficits  of this order of magnitude  may be difficult  to sustain for long, and any program
would have to involve  explicit sunset limits for subsidies  and unemployment  benefits.  If the resulting
deficit still is too high, it suggests  that the govermment:
*  must rapidly  find other  budget  savings, including  a reconsideration  of replacement  ratios;
*  has opened too large a part of the economy to import competition and may need to
consider import surcharges (again with firm sunset limits) both to raise revenue and
reduce the fraction of the labor force in uncompetitive  firms.
m  should reconsider exchange rate policy, especially if a "dirty" float is sustaining  the
currency.
Note that in addition to adding  realism to budget  and credit programs, ;.xplicit  recognition  of the budget
costs, together with credible schedules  for their elimination,  would put more pressure on workers and
firms to adjust.  Budget  targets that merely call far restraint. without  addressinghese transition costs.
act to delay reform and insure the  crtion  of involuntary  credit somewhere  in the system.
tAdmittedly  this  appears  extem,  but may  not be. Many  firms  may  be able  to cover  some  faction  of their  labor  costs.
However, since  high unemployment  will be difficult  for many TSR  socities to toleste, authorities  may well keep  open
pla  for which it would  be cheaper to pay unemployment  compamtion  instead  of subsidies.9
B.  Cew CotQoI
Achieving  control  over credit growth is of paramount  importance,  especially  in the early
stabilization stage of the reform process.  Countries further along (Hungary) in  financial sector
development  can use reserve requirements, central bank refinancing, and eventually varieus indirect
methods  for injecting  and draining  liquidity. However, at the other end of the spectrum are economies
with 'ess developed financial systems and with evident inflation concerns (Romania and the Soviet
Republics);  here, implementation  of an aggregate  credit  target will  require temporary  bank-by-bank  credit
ceilings to ensure no loss of monetary control.  Needles to say, even successful achievement  of an
(official)  credit target will be meaningless  if firms are free to create credit on their own.
A real danger of bank-by-bank  ceilings is that monetary authorities tend to enjoy the
extent of their apparent control  and are concemed  about giving  up such influence. Moreover, they have
seen the difficulties  in industrial  economies, where fickle changes in velocity  have posed problems for
central banks relying on indirect targeting methods.  And, as is well known, bank-by-bank  ceilings
impede  competition  even when they are based on an individual  bank's success at deposit mobilization. 8
However, in practice, prolonged reliance  on direct methods  of implementing  monetary
policy has revealed  this control  to be illusory,  as financial  institutions  find ways around the ceilings, such
as by the disintermediation  of the banking  system.  Thus, TSEs using bank-by-bank  ceilings should put
in place plans for a switch to  less direct methods of implementation. As the macro environment
stabilizes,  authorities  could use a system of (ow and remunerated)  reserve requirements  with auctions
of refinancing  rights at the central bank (to inject liquidity)  and of various certificates  (deposit  rights,
central  bank certificates,  or Treasury bills) at the central  bank (to absorb liquidity). Alternatively,  some
type of repurchase system could be employed. 9 It is widely thought that deep secondary markets in
%asing quotas on deposit  mobilization  rarely stimulates  much competition,  as banks often appear  unwilling  to mobilize
deposits  today for the ability  to lend  in the future. Instead, or in addition,  participating  institutions  could be allowed  to trade
their unused quotas,  since the authorities' real concern is that the aggregate  ceiling be respected.  Alternatively,  a system  of
escalating  peatics  (nmrginal  reserve  requirements)  could be levied  when banks exceed their limits, making the individual
ceilings  more like targets.
MRpurchase  agreements  (Repos)  are convenient  because  of Lhe  lack of any restriction  between  the underlying  instrument
and the term of the repo itself (see Chapter 1, Caprio and Honohan, 1991). These instruments  can be used regardless  of
whether  the authorities  aempt  to target money  or credit, or to adopt the eclectic  approach  to policy in force in several
industrl  economies. Altematively,  the authorities  could open the capital  account  and peg the exchange  rate, and thereby10
government  paper are needed to abandon  direct controls, but in fact most industrial economies  rely not
on open market operations  but on repurchase  agreements  between  the central  bank and commercial  banks
to effect  policy.  This type of intervention  merely requires  that banks have some assets  on their balance
sheets that can be securitized.' 0 The central bank can do much to spur the development  of markets and
skills needed to support less direct methods  of monetary  policy.  As these developments  take hold, the
direct controls  can be phased out.
C.  Interest Rate Policy.
In most markets the argument  for rapid liberalization  of prices is clear cut.  However,
experience  argues that one price that should  be dealt with carefully  is the intertemporal  price of money.
Premature  attempts  to liberalize  interest rates fully have resulted  in a number  of problems. The key risk
is that, in the absence  of ceilings  on interest rates, banks with little capital would bid up deposit  rates in
order to attract deposits to fund continued  loans to risky borrowers, to the detriment of more worthy,
prudent  ventures, and can lead to a spread of bankruptcies  and a collapse of the banking system.'" It
should  also be noted that high real rates may serve little purpose in TSEs: until state-owned  enterprises
(often  monopolies)  respond  to competitive  market signals, they will either pass-on such costs or not pay.
In general, full liberalization  of interest rates should be considered  when:
*  macroeconomic  conditions  are reasonably  stable;
*  the financial  condition  of banks and their borrowers is sound;
*  financial markets  are reasonably  sophisticated;  and
attempt  to import  the policy credibility  of another  central bank.
10AlItough  most industrial  economies  use some government  paper as the underlying  asset, othen use centrml  bank paper
or even an approved  list of performing  loans.
"The Chilen  refomns  of the mid-70s  and Turkey's lberalization in the early 1980s, often cited as exampls,  entaild
reportd  (ex post) ral  intt  rtes  of 20% to 50% (and at times higherl)  that were sustained for long periods of time.
Bankruptcies  also soared, particularly  in Chile.  Similarly,  in a highly  concentrated  environment,  banks might char  high
spreads.11
financial  markets are sufficiently  competitive  or contestable.
In some of the TSEs, none of the above criteria is met, suggesting caution in freeing interest rates.
Wherever  there is no control or market incentive  system at the firm level (as then risky or loss making
firms will not be eliminated  from bidding  for credit no matter  what the interest rate), interest  rate controls
should  be maintained  (as argued  by Dooley-Isard, 1991). In Hungary (and Egypt, also in effect a TSE)
indirect  methods  of implementation  (through  treasury  bills)  are in use and appear  to be working  well, and
many  rates (those not associated  with directed credit) are essentially  market driven.
For countries  not yet ready  to liberalize  interest rates, authorities  can strive  to rationalize
their structure  -- that is, eliminate the largest interest subsidies -- and aim for positive real rates.  With
the difficulty  in estimating expected  inflation, attaining  positive real rates will not be straightforward.
Since  monetary  policy in most cases is being  determined  by aggregate  credit targets. the authorities' main
goal is to ascertain  that deposit  rates are high enough  to mobilize  sufficient  resources and that banks are
allowed  a sufficient  spread.  Unless a deliberate  attempt  is being made to erase a monetary  overhang  by
inflation  or by a large wave of privatizations,  authorities  should at the very least raise interest rates on
very short term deposits  when overall  deposits  cease to grow in nominal  terms  or (preferably)  in line with
some estimate  of inflation. The banks should  then be allowed  to set remaining  deposit rates themselves.
Minimum  deposit  rates could be linked to a central  bank discount  rate, adjusting  automatically  whenever
the latter varied." 2 A rigid structure of interest rates should be avoided: if the authorities  are putting a
floor on short-term deposit rates, and are using current inflation  to determine  real rates, they should be
prepared  to adjust it on (say) a 3-month, moving-average  basis.
In some TSEs competition  is limited,  with most borrowers  in practice able to borrow  only
from a limited number (1 or 2) of banks.  In these countries a cap should also be considered for the
average spread between deposit and lending  rates.  However, if imposed, the limit should be kept well
above  the average  deposit rate (at least 5 to 10  percentage  points, higher if capital  requirements  are raised
above BIS standards) to allow for the financing  of projects with a high rate of return, as well as to
provide  for adequate  remuneration  for banks, who will surely need to be taking liberal  provisions  on new
'21n  some  of the TSEs, banks with large numbers  of accounts  fLnd  it difficult  to adjust interest rates often, as accounts
are maintained  without  the use of computers  or calculators.12
loans in  a  risky environment."  A limit on spreads between average lending rates and  average
borrowing  rates would  provide  the greatest amount  of flexibility  for banks (in lending  to somewhat  riskier
projects), compared with an absolute limit on lending  rates.  However, it should be realized that banks
can evade interest rate ceilings (for example, by charging commissions  or  requiring compensating
balances)  especially  if the limits are allowed  to persist.14
III. Corporate  Finance:  Intermediaries,  Securities  Markets, and Directed
Credit
The major issue  facing TSEs is the financing  of new plant and equipment  in both existing
industries and emerging firms.' 5 Indeed, this paper's analysis  of Macro-Finance, "Old'  Loans, Bank
Efficiency,  and Human Capital  Development  can all be viewed  as issues  associated  with encouraging  the
development  of a financial  system that mobilizes  and allocates  resources efficiently. The present  section
discusses  the channels  through which  savings  make  their way to productive  endeavors. Within the special
context  of TSEs, we describe  the problems  with relying  on each of these channels  to intermediate  between
savers and investors. Besides  creating an enabling  environment  by promoting  a sound legal system and
effective supervision, we also describe more activist  government involvement  in channelling  resources
to worthy projects.
Banks. Although  loan-issuing  banks are typically  major conduits  of external resources  to
promising  enterprises,  there  are two elements  of the existing  environment  in reforming  central  and eastern
'this  assumes that the banks' portfolios  have already been cleaned. It is not recommended  to allow banks with a large
amount  of non-performing  loans  to cover their losses  with high spreads  on new loans, the consequences  of which are
claborated  in the World Develooment  Report, 1989.
'41n  China this type of administcred  interest rate policy has been followed  with wixed results. The main succas had
been in the field of deposit mobilization,  attributable  in part to the maintenance  of realistic  deposit rates.  Average  real
deposit  rates were, with one excepticn, slightly  positive  in real (cx post) terms between 1970 and 1984, and have retumed to
positive  levels following  their drop in 1988-9.  The absence  of substantially  negative  real interest rates likely  played  a role in
maintaining  China's high savings  rate.  On the other hand, the authorities  allowed  only a very narrow spread (sometimes
negative)  between  deposit  and lending  rates, and continue  to allocate  credit, thus contributing  to a mi-allocation  of
resources, albeit one that is difricult  to measure.
15Finance  of working capital  and trade is less of a problem, especially  in the more advanced  TSEs.  However,  when
there is a large  arresrs problem, even short-term, relatively  secure  credit can suffer.13
european  countries  that suggest  that other sources  of finance  may have to play a larger than expected  role:
(1) the huge structural  shocks  that have hit these economies  would  have damaged  and made tentative  any
banking  system;  and (2) the environment  is characterized  by great uncertainty. Even (especially!)  if these
countries had the "best" banks, bankers, legal structures, and regulators, banks probably would be
reluctant  to be major financiers  of emerging  firms, and may even hesitate  to tend to all but the very best
credit risks. Thus, retained  earnings  and non-loan  making  financial  intermediaries  may  play a particularly
important  role, and there are some debatable arguments  for specific public policy actions to prod the
dominant  existing  financial institutions  -banks -to finance more aggressively  emerging firms during the
transition.
In a  very uncertain environment, replete with informational asymmetries, retained
earnings  may be an especially  important  and efficient  form of corporate finance. A crucial complicating
factor for some enterprises, however, is that they are burdened with debts incurred under socialism.
Consequently,  these firms are paying interest and principal to banks instead of having more retained
earnings available for investment.  While financial commitments  should be enforced, it is not clear
whether  state-owned  firms that were issued credit as part of the previous regime have a commitment  in
a market based system  to satisfy those debts or whether the government  should explicitly assume  them.
In terms of promoting efficient  corporate finance, explicit assumption  of past debts by the government
would increase retained earnings and thereby enhance the resources directly available to firms for
investnent.  Of course even with debt relief,  many existing firms are not viable in  the current
environment.
Universal Banks. Other TntegMediaries,  and  Securities Markets. In  a  highly risky
environment  where loan issuing  banks are reluctant  to finance emerging  firms, the decision  by most TSEs
to allow banks to purchase  equity in firms increases  the potential return (and risk) from financing  risky
ventures  without  the adverse  selection  problems  associated  with raising interest rates on loan contracts.
Nonetheless, policy makers should be cautious and particularly aggressive in establishing appropriate
supervisory and regulatory agencies, since close ties between banking and  industry has often had
disastrous consequences in developing countries.  Most TSE banks are still learning the basics of
commercial banking and may merely acquire bad debt and bad equity, instead of just the former.
Moreover, the economic  environment  is fraught  with risk, especially  associated  with economic  policies,
and supervis.y  capacity  is limited.14
Non-bank  financial  intermediaries  such as mutual funds, investment  banks, and venture
capital funds may play an increasingly  important  role in financing growing enterprises. Policy makers
should anticipate  these developments  and adopt (1) legal codes and institutions  to enforce contracts and
(2) regulatory guidelines and enforcement  mechanisms to oversee the spectrum of financiel market
activities  likely to evolve.
Many TSEs in central and eastern europe are moving quickly to establish securities
markets.  In addition to facilitating  corporate capital financing through public offerings, these markets
provide financial services that complement banks by increasing the liquidity associated with holding
equity, facilitating  the ability of individuals  to hold diversified portfolios, and allowing individuals  to
adjust their portfolios more easily after large-scale privatization  occurs.  In addition, there may be
positive  dynamic interactions  between securities  markets and the evolution  of mutual funds, investment
banks, and venture capital firms." 6 Thus, the financial services provided by equity markets and the
financial  institutions  assisted  by the existence  of equity  markets  should  importantly  complement  banks and
retained earnings in financing investment." Still. firms need to be monitored. and it is plausible that
banks  can better perform  this role (by regulating  the supply  of external  funds)  than can large shareholders
(by using the blunt instrument  of removing  managersL. t 8
More Activist Policies. In terms of corporate finance, policy makers face a common
problem: is the optimal  policy  to simply  provide  an enabling  environment,  or is there a role or obligation
on the part of the government to participate  actively by providing finance to specific industries  or by
setting credit guidelines for financial  intermediaries?
Given the problems involved  in restructuring large state enterprises, governments will
have to be involved, perhaps through an interministerial  council or a state ownership fund.  Smaller
firms, the restructuring  of which will be politically  sensitive, can be left to the banks to handle. Where
the government has decided to funnel credit to state-owned  enterprises, it should consider: i) explicitly
'6Robert Pardy (1992) develops  this point.
"It  is woe.! noting that direct  foreign investment, trade credits,  and fcreign  loans ma3y  kelp fund corporate capital
formation. This paper, however, only discusses  international  finance  in the context of foreign financial  intermediaries
establishing  or undettaking  cooperative  ventures  with domestic  financial  institutions  in TSEs.
"Scharfstein  (1992)  cites this arguments  as a lesson from the Japanese  experience.15
providing credit, or ii) using specialized  institutions  to lend to these firms, instead of directing state-
owned banks or private banks  on where to loan funds."9  This not only improves  accountability,  it keeps
state-owned  bank balance sheets from deteriorating  further because of political considerations. Thus,
explicitly  separating government  credit decisions  from sound banking  practices  should enharice  banking
skills, financial  discipline, and the ability  to privatize banks.  Loans made by banks under socialism to
large enterprises that are currently making losses should perhaps be assumed by the government to
promote  sound  banking  practices  and curtail  the political  nature of credit  decisions  made  by banks. Banks
should not be called upon to enforce hard budget constraints  on large, state-owned  enterprises where
political considerations  play an overriding role.  Indeed, private banks may have a tendency to loan
money  to state-owned  enterprises  regardless  of enterprise  profitability, to the extent  of implicit  or explicit
government  guarantees. This beh.avior  could reduce the availability  of credit for emerging enterprises,
especially  if the government  guarantees  a substantial  amount of credit for state-owned  enterprises.
Financing emerging enterprises raises another set of policy issues.  There are good
reasons to suspect that formal financial institutions may be  reluctant or slow to  finance emerging
enterprises. As noted  above, banks may  retrench  over the next  few years,especially  from providing  long-
term capital, just when emerging private sector firms need financing. Thus Hungary, the farthest along
in the transition process, has seen a lack of long term finance (Vittas and Neal, 1992).  In addition,
current loan decisions  may be strongly influenced  by past loans and government  guarantees, rather than
by fu.ture  profitability. Since  TSE governments  are attempting  to move  away from excessive  involvement
in economic  activity, imposing  directed  credit  guidelines  on financial  intermediaries  may not be attractive.
However, governments  may wish to spell out a schedule  for the decline  of the proportion  of total credit
that is extended  to state enterprises. This might free resources  for new private sector  firms and of course
would put a deadline  on restructuring/privatization  decisions.  If directed credit schemes are used for
new firms. government  interference  in credit decisions  should  be broad based, allow banks discretion in
choosing customers. and transparent.  Govermnents,  with World Bank assistance, could support the
emergence  of accounting  and auditing firms to improve the transparency  and accuracy of the financial
statements  of local firms, thereby mitigating  some of the informational  problems  impeding  the provision
of bank credit to emerging  enterprises. Lastly,  it is worthwhile  noting  that in the case of Hungary, state-
19lf  specialized  institutions  are used, they should  be funded  either  directly from the budget  or by bonds, but not by
deposits. These  institutions  could have an advantage  in monitoring  loans to the extent that they were able to hire
professionals  with banking skills.16
owned banks are trying to establish business relationships with emerging firms,  but resolving and
restructuring  old debts interferes  with the ability  of banks to make loans to new customers. Thus, in the
case of Hungary, the government  determining  where to direct credit is not the major issue; the problem
is the large inherited  stock of debts from under socialism.
A.  The Shbae  of the Financial  System
One extreme view on corporate finance (McKinnon,  :  ) is that, because of problems
of moral hazard, inherent risk, and insufficient  supervision, in the early stages of transition all finance
should be through retained  earnings and equity. He would also leave the privatization  of banking  until
the completion  of the reform process.  We agree that the environment  is risky, and would argue that a
narrow banking  model, in which "banks"  are only permitted  to collect  deposits and invest funds  in short-
term, low risk instruments,  has some merit as a solution to problems facing TSEs.  Other firms -
"nonbanks"  - would  be permitted  to take deposits  or equity shares (like money  market mutual  funds) and
make loans or hold equity positions in nonfinancil firms.  These firms would still need to hold capital
and to be supervised, with capital ratios and supervision  increasing  in accordance  with the "nearness"  of
instruments to the payments system.  That is,  if these nonbanks are permitted to offer fixed rate,
checkable deposits, then capital and supervision should be higher than if they only offer equity-like
claims, such as money market mutual funds (checkable)  or non-checkable  mutual funds.  With banks
essentiallv  risk free, the government  should  not rescue the "nonbanks"  that get into difficulties. Indeed,
these nonbanks could be restricted from calling themselves  banks.  Only banks would be part of the
clearing  system, so that this alternative  has the advantage  of safeguarding  the payments mechanism. A
difficulty  with this option concerns  the risk faced by banks if they are allowed to hold even very short
term paper  of either supposedly  safe "nonbanks"  or enterprises. Clearly the greater the holdings  of such
paper, the greater the need for capital.  Early on in the reform process only government  paper might
qualify as a potential  asset for narrow banks.  However, if residents  are quite risk averse - have a high
demand for guaranteed  narrow bank deposits -- then small and medium scale firms in the private sector
will be starved for funds.D
20 If residents  arc quite risk averse, the interest rate on government  paner might fail to zero,  or below.  For a
discussion  of narrow banks in a U.S. context, see Lawrence  (1985, Lawrence  and TaUey  (1987), and Litan (1986).17
We would eschew  McKinnon's  extreme  position  of banning  debt finance, in part because
of the dearth of examples  of financial systems  relying solely on self-finance  and equity. 2'  The absence
of debt finance likely would limit  investmnent  and restrain growth, but without more rapid growth the
entire reform process is in jeopardy.  Moreover, TSE governments  seem determined to try to emulate
a view of the German/European  universal banking  model, aid may well be averse to not having "real"
banks. Thus a narrow bank model may well prove unacceptable.
A second alternative  would  be to establish  high risk-asset  ratios  - perhaps  on the order of 1C%  -
15% - to allow  for the riskiness  of the environment. A high capital ratio would automatically  limit the
number of commercial  banks to be supervised, an importanvt  consideration  with nascent supervisory
systems, Such a ratio also would achieve  the goal of a low leverage rate for nonfinancial  firms.  Banks
should be allowed  to earn spreads commensurate  with the capital ratio in effect, as suggested  above. If
well capitalized  banks still fail, the cost to the goverrnent should be minimized  by allowing depositors
to experience  losses.  As banks, supervisors, and policy makers acquire greater experience and the
macro environment  stabilizes,  these capital ratios could be lowered, and indeed we view it as urgent to
devote more resources to institution  building and training.  Lastly, a hybrid of these two alternatives  -
whereby capital and the list of allowed activities would be tiered according to the proximity to the
payments system - may work, but may require more supervisory skills than many TSEs possess at
present.
2'McKinnon  cites runl  China in the 1980s  and the Soviet  Union during the 1920s.
a  Many  obserers argue that higher capital  ratios may induce  greater  risk taking or that capital  can disappear  quickly
when a bank gets into trouble.  Even  so, we believe a capital  ratio of say 15%  will lead to a lower failure rate among  banks
in TSEs  than a capital ratio of 5%.18
IV. lrheritance of Old Loans:  Current  and Future  Problems
A.  The Sie  of the Bad Loan Problem.
Many enterprises in transitional  socialist economies are unable to service their debts to
banks.2?  The size of the 'bad'  loan problem  is very difficult  to estimate. Enormous changes  in relative
prices, poor information  and uncertainty  regarding enterprise profitability and viability, the absence  of
accurate  enterprise  accounts  and reliable bank audits,  macroeconomic  instability,  and the unsure  pace and
durability  of privatization  and liberalization  make it impossible  to assess accurately  the magnitude  of the
bad loan problem. These same complicating  factors  make it difficult  to determine  the ability of any or.i
enterprise to satisfy debt obligations.  Although  subject to error and change, the bad loan situation is
"large" in many countries. Estimates  from selected  audits  suggest that 20% to 25% of total bank loans
may have a good probability of being repaid. This low figure reflects "original sins" at the time the
reform process began, the decline  of CMEA trade, and often sharp falls in output.
B.  jmpli  ation£of  the Bad Loan Problem.
£a2ital  A'loqation. As argued in Levine-Scott  and Dooley-Isard, the inherited stock of
bad loans is directly  distorting  the allocation  of credit and indirectly  impeding  improvements  in allocative
efficiency. Banks  are issuing  credit to troubled firms to help them pay wages and service old debts and
are not establishing  business  relations  with emerging  private firms as aggressively  as might occur in the
absence of a large stock of bad loans.  Furthermore, the unresolved state of old debts, their potential
seniority  to new debts, and the difficulty  old debts introduce  in attaching  secure collateral  claims  for new
loans hinder efficient capital allocation. Finally, the large stock of bad loans retards improvements  in
capital allocation  by slowing  the pace of bank privatization,  thereby delaying enhancements  in incentives
and the importation  of foreign expertise through joint ventures.  Indeed the inability  of banks to make
sound credit decisions  could impede transition  and contribute  to a decline in economic  activity.
33  In addition, bar"  in some countries  are losing funds  because  they provided  loans at subsidized  interest rates.  For
example,  intraet rate subidies on housing  loans in Hungary  amounted  to 2.3% of GDP in 1989,  and the government  is
directly  compenuting the banks for these losses.19
Qperational  Efficiency.  Bank insolvency  impedes the reorientation  of management  and
staff toward more profitable  banking  operations,  so that limited  human  resources are focused  on resolving
old debts rather than on acquiring  new skills and implementing  new operational  procedures. Moreover,
it is argued  that the current ineffective  organizational  structure (with the centralized  design of the banking
system)  facilitates  substantial  interactions  among  the banks, governments,  and enterprises  that are required
to workout  the old debts. Thus, the overhang  of inherited  debts impedes  improvements  in the operational
efficiency  of banks.  It must be emphasized,  however, that the debt overhang impedes but does not
prevent improvements. In many  countries,  banks have invested  in training their staffs and have initiated
business  ties with new enterprises, but inherited  loans are slowing these advances.
Superyision  and Regulation.  Establishing  sound  bank supervision  and regulation  in TSEs
is a complicated  task for a number of reasons.  In terms of bank credit, the banking system is highly
concentrated  and insolvent,  where losses  typically  exceed  capital  by several multiples. This makes it very
difficult  to supervise  and regulate bankcs  in a consistent  and effective  manner because  (1) supervisors  and
regulators  are unable to close down non-viable  banks because  of their size; (2) political pressures  on the
large state-owned  banks to lend  to specific  enterprises way conflict  with sound  bank regulations;  and (3)
since the net worth of many banks is negative,  standard  capital adequacy  requirements  cannot be applied
to major banks.  These factors hinder the provision sound regulatory oversight  of the major banks and
make it virtually  impossible  to establish  consistent  guidelines for financial  institutions.
At the same time that bank concentration  stymies effective bank oversight, the rapid
emergence  of new banks can overwhelm  efforts to train adequate  staff and prepare effective  guidelines
for licensing, supervising, and regulating new banks.  Changes are occurring quickly in the financial
sectors  of many  TSEs and authorities  are having  difficulties  providing  sound  oversight  of financial  sector
developments,  which may set the stage for future financial instability. These factors may impede the
application  of clear supervisory  and regulatory  guidelines  to emerging financial intermediaries.
Privatization.  It is difficult  and even  irresponsibleto  privatize  highly  insolvent  state-owned
banks in transitional  socialist  economies. Not only are there high costs and great uncertainties  associated
with evaluating  the market value of bank assets, the negative  net worth of banks implies that (1) many
banks  might be quickly liquidated  if privatized  and (2) new owners with little capital  at risk might  engage
in extremely  risky ventures  that could  magnify  losses. Since  existing  state owned banks  compose  the bulk20
of the £ iancial system in these countries, privatizing  banks in their current state could jeopardize the
stability of the monetary and payments system'4 Furthermore, the likely negative consequences  of
privatizing  insolvent  banks would damage policy maker credibility.
C.  Resolving  the Bad Debt Problem
There are no attractive policies for coping with large, insolvent, state-owned banks
because they all involve the recognition  and assumption  of losses.  Furthermore, even if the bad debt
problem disappeared, losses in the  enterprise sector, an  insufficient number of  well-trained bank
managers, bank staffs, regulators, supervisors, lawyers, and the lack of  firmly established legal,
accounting,  regulatory  institutions  suggest  that the bad debt problem  may quickly  reappear. Nonetheless,
the existing  bad debt problem  must be confronted,  and resolving  the bad debt problem in a cost effective
way should assist the formulation  of forward looking fiiancial sector reforms focussed on creating a
healthy and secure domestic financial  system over the next years.  In the remainder of this section, we
briefl  discuss approaches that have been widely used - often in various combinations  - and other
approaches  that are being suggested  for TSEs. Of course, unless fundamental  changes  are instituted,  the
bad loan problem is likely to quickly reappear (as seems to be  the case in  Poland, Romania, and
Bulgaria), and countries will be left only with the costs of higher inflation.
12osits.  One option is to "tax" deposits.  This could take many forms from simple
expropriation  to inflation. In Poland, Yugoslavia,  Bulgaria and Romania (where government  deposits
in banks  temporarily  played an important  role in restoring  bank solvency),  inflation  has lowerod  the value
of deposits (recall Figure 1, above).  Since most TSEs have already reduced the tax base, ever higher
inflation  rates will be needed  to utilize  this revenue  source, to the long term determinant  of the economy.
A variant of the "taxing" deposits approach  is a depoite  sw  , which entails the
transformation  of a large fraction of deposits into equity claims.  As a potential benefit, this approach
2  Besides  lowering  the price  of enterprises,  the large  stock  of bad  loans  may  also  complicate  and poltcize the process
of privaizing  cnterprises.  Domestic  and foreign  invetors  will  have  incentives  to lobby  the govemment  to asume
responsibilify  of past  dobts,  which  niy produce  case-by-case  govenunent  involvement  in cnterprise  debt  management  and
introduce  delays d wcetanty into  the privation  poces.21
would  encourage  the privatization  and efficient  operation  of banks. But, a forcad deposit-for-equity  swap
may raise fairness questions, reduce confidence  in the financial  system, and induce a large drop in the
money  supply without improving  bank performance.
A second variant, the detsab  swa,  replaces bad bank assets with equities in the
enterprises.  Although this could be  part of  the resolution process, the bad loan situation seems
sufficiently  large that a debt-equity  swap would  yield banks that own very large shares of the enterprise
sector. Thus, banks would be in a position  of managing  a substantial  portion of the real-sector, which
is an area in which they have no experience. It may be bmtter  for the banking system and the economy
to have banks focus on building capabilities  in banking, not enterprise management. Also, acquiring
equity in non-viable  firms does not resolve bank insolvency;  put succinctly  bad debt equals bad equity.
Dgbt-Bond  Swap. The most common  approach to resolving the bad debt problem is to
replace  loans with government-backed  assets. These  could  be government  bonds, government  guaranteed
mortgages,  or claims  on privatization  funds. Although  the debt  -for-bond  swap is likely  to be an important
component  of the solution,  this approach  also has problems: it is very difficult  in the current environment
to distinguish  bad loans from good loans; case-by-case  debt-bond  swaps  are likely to politicize  the process
and create expectations  of future government  involvement;  and if all enterprise debts are substituted  for
government  bonds  in a once-and-for-all  attempt  to break with the past, tax raising  requirements  may rise
significantly  unless  the government  is able to identify  other revenue  sources such as selling more  publicly
held assets (the housing  stock, real estate, etc.) or maintaining  some shares of "privatized"  firms."  Any
of these solutions may help both banks and the enterprises, but a healthy financial sector will not be
achieved  until the financial institutions  themselves  and their incentive  systems are reformed, the subject
of the next section.
25  Levine  and Scott (1992)  suggest  that  the effect on the fiscal situation  dends  on the privatization  process.  If firms
are  sold  to the pubL;c,  a grand  debt-bond  swap  is unlikely  to importantly  raise tax raising requirements. On the other hand,
if shas  in firms  are simply distributed  to the public, more revenues  will have to be raised through traditional  fiscal
channes  to satisfy  the luger sok  of govenment obligations.22
V.  Building  More  Efficient  Banks
It is not possible to construct a step-by-step  financial reform program applicable  to all
TSEs that will quickly establish  efficient financial  sectors, and even for a single country there is not a
unique road or  sequencing path.  The unbreakable - though malleable - ties between financial and
economic  development  suggest  that appropriate  reforms in the financial  and enterprise sectors, as well
as in the areas of price and trade liberalization  are interrelated. Although at some level these linkages
are too complicated  to be confidently  disentangled,  we can formulate some strategies based on the
presumption that the TSEs have decided to become market-based,  free-market economies based on a
'European'  model of economic  organization.  In particular, certain steps can be taken to promote
competition  and improve  the incentives  of managers.
Ownership  and Concentration.  In central  and eastern  european  countries  that have  decided
to make the transition to market economies, the banking system is typically highly concentrated  and
ultimately  owned  by the government. For example,  two state-owned  commercial  banks in Czechoslovakia
account for 80% of commercial  lending and almost all of the remaining  20% is by other state-owned
banks.  Similarly, the two major state-owned  savings banks receive the vast majorily of household
deposits. In Hungary, large state controlled  banks - but with minority private participation  - currently
account for about 35% of commercial  lending compared with about 8% in 1987, and privately  owned
banks are becoming increasingly  competitive.
'rhe state's ownership  of banks can be direct or circuitous. In Bulgaria, the state-owned
Central Bank, the Foreign Trade Bank (which is primarily  owned by the Central Bank), and major state-
owned enterprises  own the commercial  banks.  In Hungary, the state directly owns about 42% of the
major banks, with approximately  35% held by state-owned  enterprises  and cooperatives,  and 15% held
by other state-owned  financial institutions.
State ownership  of the vast majority  of the banking  system and the generally  very high
concentration  of bank activity  create  a number  of problems. First, the highly concentrated  banking  sector
may reduce competition  among existing  banks, discourage  the emergence  of some new banks, and slow23
improvements  in bank efficiency.2  Second, when a few large enterprises control the bulk of the
banking  sector, bank lending may be skewed toward enterprises  that own banks, and enterprise control
of bank credit may be used to discourage competitors. Third, central bank ownership of banks can
conflict  with responsible  monetary  policy and prudential  regulation. Finally, when the state still owns
the vast majority  of the banking  sector, political  priorities can easily come to influence  capital allocation
decisions  and managerial  incentives,  as is most clearly  evident in China.
Reform: Issues and Complicationl.  Policy makers can stimulate improvements  in bank
efficiency  by encouraging  competition  in and contestability  of the market for financial services, once
financial  soundness  is achieved. Whether existing  banks are privatized  or not, some restructuring  of the
highlv concentrated  banking  sector seems necessary  to foster competition  and contestability.
Bank restructuring to promote competition  and privatization  could take many forms
depending  on the country's particular circumstances.  For example,  a few major commercial  and savings
banks could be broken-up into smaller banks to encourage competition in the retail and commercial
banking market.  The savings banks could be permitted - some might argue prodded - to enter the
commercial  loan market, while  commercial  banks could be allowed - or even urged - to take household
deposits,  provide mortgages,  and make  other household  loans. Where savings  banks  have a large branch
network that holds almost all household  deposits and commercial  banks have only a few branches and
obtain most of their funds from savings banks, the central bank, and the government, the merging of
components  of  the large savings banks with components of the large commercial banks could be
considered. The speed and scope of restructuring,  however, should be consistent  with the acute shortage
of managers  and staff adequately  trained to operate in a market based economic  system. Furthermore,
'breaking-up' banks can create its own set of problems: breaking-up  banks along regional  or operational
lines may produce institutions that  are functionally and financially specialized without stimulating
competition;  and experience  in other countries  suggests  that bank reorganizations  typically  require above
normal  managerial  oversight  ror several years after the reorganization  to be successful. Thus, while  bank
restructuring appears to be a prerequisite for increased competition, effectively carving out smaller
financial  institutions  from the existing system will require great care.
X Again, lthe  key words are 'reduce,'  'discourage,"  and 'slow."  Competition  among banks is on the rise, new banks
are entering  the market,  and efficiency  is improving,  but these  positive  developments  would probably  occur more rapidly in
the absence  of a highly  concentrated,  state-owned  banidng  system.24
Governments  can facilitate competition  In and contestability  of the banking market by
quickly adopting legal codes, legal institutions, anti-trust guidelines, licensing procedures, efficient
payments  mechanisms,  and regulatory  agencies  necessary  to support  new banks. Indeed, some strategists
suggest letting new private sector enterprises and financial intermediaries  bloom and grow until they
overwhelm  large state-owned  institutions  without  necessarily  "fixing"  the problems  with the state-owned
institutions. While  encouraging  "new  flowers  to bloom"  is undeniably  crucial,  pruning, and rehabilitating
existing structures may create a  more fruitful and prosperous country while also  creating a more
hospitable  environment  for new entrants.
New entrants have some significant advantages  over the remnants of the mono-bank
system. Existing  banks are burdened  with a large stock  of non-performing  loans that are a result of loans
made under socialism  and the large changes  produced  by economic  liberalization  including  the break-up
of the CMEA trading arrangements. Furthermore, if the authorities  direct state-owned  banks to issue
credit to large enterprises for political reasons, this further impedes the ability of existing banks to
compete  with emerging banks not required to support public policies.  On the other hand, state-owned
banks do not face a hard budget  constraint, may  confront  easier tax requirements  than private banks, and
may enjoy greater confidence  on the part of depositors. Thus, until existing banks are privatized and
debts inherited  from socialism  are extinguished,  the playing field is unlikely  to be level.
Ownership/Privatization.  Having restructured banks to  promote competition, bank
efficiency  and stability  could  be encouraged  by privatizing  some  state-owned  banks or by improving  their
ownership structhire. Authorities should disassemble  ownership structures in which large enterprises
(often state-owned  and insolvent) own the major, often insolvent banks, because of the inherent and
potentially  dangerous distortion  of iticentives. Although less problematic  than enterprise ownership  of
banks, central bank ownership  of commercial  and savings banks could interfere with optimal  monetary
policy and bank regulation. Until banks are privatized, investment  trusts or independent  bank boards of
directors  could  be constructed  where financial  performance  targets and managerial  incentives  mimic  those
of privately owned banks except for explicitly  stated exceptions.
The privatization  of some of the existing banks should improve managerial incentives,
enhance  foreign  participation,  expedite  the retraining  of personnel,  reduce  direct government  involvement,
and augment the ability to  institute comprehensive  and  effective regulation and supervision.  As25
mentioned  above, highly centralized  banking systems  will have to be broken down before privatization
to avoid the creation  of private monopolies. In addition, the early stage of development  of supervisory,
regulatory, and licensing  procedures and institutions  suggest that privatization  of existing banks should
proceed with caution.  It is worth suggesting  here that authorities  begin the privatization  of the banking
sector early even if this process proceeds slowly.  For example, some banks could be restructured, so
that a few small state-owned  banks are relatively unburdened  with bad loans.  These banks could be
privatized early to  establish the governments commitment  to supporting a private, market oriented
financial  system. Governments  should initiate  this process even while considering  more comprehensive
approaches  to coping  with the inherited  "bad" loan  problem. With such a strategy, the emerging  private
sector could be served by new banks and some privatized  state banks.
Although  this paper does not evaluate  the different methods  that can be used to privatize
banks [see McNaughton (1992) forthcoming], it is worth mentioning  some of the mechanisms  here.
Banks can be sold to domestic entrepreneurs,  and foreign financial institutions; sales to domestic
nonfinancial  institutions  risks connected  lending. Similarly, banks can be privatized  using vouchers or
bank shares can be distributed to mutual funds that are in turn owned by the public.  We only mention
here that the process is important  because the method of privatization  will strongly influence  who will
own the country's major financial  institutions:  enterprises  ownership  of banks has proven problematic  in
other countries, and experience teaches that careful attention should be paid to the qualifications  of
entrepreneurs  purchasing  banks.
Role of Foreign Banks. Foreign  banks and other financial  institutions  can play a key role
in assisting  TSEs in the transition  process. At one level, the issue  of how much foreign  bank penetration
a government should allow would seem to  revolve around the same issues as in many developing
countries. As benefits,  foreign banks bring skills and experience  that can be used to upgrade quickly  the
quality  of financial  services available  to domestic firms (and households),  and can serve as an important
input  in training local bankers.  On the cost side are three concerns: first, the potential political  liability
in the event that foreign institutions  earn substantial  profits or gain "excessive"  market share; second, the
weakening  of domestic banks' portfolios  to the extent that foreign banks attract the best credit risks in
the country; and third, a fear that foreign banks will be more likely, in comparison  with domestic  banks,
to retrench in bad times.  Most governments  resolve these issues  in favor of some foreign participation
in banking,  either as branches, subsidiaries,  or joint ventures.26
In TSEs, however, a few additional  factors appear to make a substantial  foreign bank
presence  an important issue for policy makers.  At the very least, the proximity of Western European
banks to TSEs in Eastern Europe, as well as historical ties between Eastern and Western European
financial  systems  suggest  that significant  penetration  by foreign  banks may be a real possibility  in several
TSEs.  Indeed, by the end of 1991, there were already 21 joint venture banks in Hungary with some
foreign  participation. Also, the population  in Eastern European  TSEs have a high degree of literacy and
strong quantitative  training, in comparison  with many developing countries, and may be better able to
make quick use of the training provided  by foreign banks.  Moreover, and perhaps most importantly,
TSEs are contemplating  a massive wave of privatization, which will require support from financial
institutions,  not only in the form of credit but advisory  services as well.  Allowing  an important  role for
foreign  or joint venture banks may be necessary  if privatization  is to advance rapidly.
In view of these considerations,  governments  might best be advised as to how to get
favorable  terms for foreign bank entry. One lesson from experience  in developing  countries  is that high
taxation  of foreign banks will encourage  them to under invest in training and local skills development,
precisely  what the TSEs want most from these  banks. Instead, authorities  in TSEs might want to consider
trading market access for a commitment  to training by foreign banks, both through "twinning' foreign
and local banks' staffs, as well as active participation  in -- including perhaps monetary support of - a
bankers association  (or institute)  that sponsors  training courses. Top-rated  foreign institutions  usually  are
more attracted to wholly-owned  branches  and subsidiaries  rather than joint venture banks, but may well
find attractive  an arrangement  whereby they would provide management  and training for a number  of
years, such as is found in a "build-own-operate"  transaction.
VI.  Human  Capital  Development  in the Financial  Sector
Although many observers agree on the importance of human capital in the financial
sector, a key problem is that this has not yet been developed  on anywhere  near the scale needed  to effect
change rapidly.  In fact, there may be a lack of appreciation in many quarters of the low level of
awareness  of market and legal processes in TSEs.  Even when, for example, government officials can
agree on a program of reform for specific  sectors,  on legal changes  needed, or on the development  of27
a bank supervision  department, implementation  of reforms often is difficult  even when specific advice
is left behind by visiting experts. In many TSEs there is but a thin layer of expertise in the finance
ministry, the central bank, or in any of the commercial  banks, and the technical assistance  supplied  has
ben  sporadic and mostly short term.
In order to improve  TSEs ability to adjust, a far greater emphasis  should be given to
technical  assistance  and training.  Both the finance  ministry and central  bank need experts on long term
assignments  to provide advice on policy design and implementation,  and to assist in the "in-house'
training of staff.  In the central bank this is especially  crucial in the areas of research and statistics,
monetary  policy implementation,  and bank supervision. Long term assignments  would both give added
credibility  to the advice provided  as well  as raise its relevance  to specific  country  situations. Advice  from
experts  visiting for one to three week intervals  can get "lost," given the sheer numbers of advisers from
various countries  and organizations. Even when certain recommendations  are accepted, TSE officials
often need assistance  on implementing  the policy changes. Thus, long-term advisers would be able to
assist and educate  officials on a day-by-basis,  sort through recommendations  from foreign  experts, guide
policy changes through the implementation  stage, and help train staff.  For banks and other financial
sector institutions, only a small fraction of individuals  are being trained in what are very short-term
courses; a substantial  expansion  of training  programs would appear warranted,  and would turn out under
various scenarios to have been a worthwhile use of resources.  Thorough asset quality reviews of
commercial  banks, though expensive, should  be undertaken  not so much for the data uncovered  as for
the on-the-job training and forced reexamination  of institutional  priorities and incentives.  Although
investments  in human  capital might not offer high visibility, it may well be the area in which the World
Bank can have its greatest impact  and also yield high returns.
VII.  Concluding  Notes
Many of the arguments in this paper are based on the notions that finance is important
for economic  development,  that banks are needed to help with the transition process, and that private
incentives are important for financial sector performance.  To be sure, finance is risky, and it is
understandable  that there is an aversion  to "cleaning  up" the banks if another round of support will be28
required In the future.  Consequently,  we believe that banks should be 'cleaned up" when they are
privatized  to avoid the quick  reemergence  of bad debt problems. Furthermore, we believe  that either of
the proposed alternatives  for the future shape of the financial  system in TSEs - (very) highly-capitalized
banking  or narrow banking  - would minimize  the need for future support. Either alternative  will lead
to lower leverage  in TSF.q  and should provide  more financial  stability. However, taking concers  about
moral hazard to an extreme and arguing that debt finance should be prohibited (McKinnon's proposal)
runs the risk of starving  new firms for credit and limiting economic  growth.  Without a healthy growth
rate, the reform oriented resolve  of TSE governments  may wane.
Institution  building in the financial sector is of paramount importance, and should be
pursued  as rapidly as possible through training, technical  assistance, and foreign bank entry, and should
be complemented  by pi-ivatizing  some part of the state banking  system. Some or many  of the state banks
in each TSE may well remain in government  control  for several years or be permanently  closed, but we
view it as urgent to increase the part of the financial sector that will respond to market incentives  as
rapidly as is prudent, a pace that undoubtedly  will vary among  TSEs.29
Appendix
Financial  Sector Refofm in the TSEs:  a progress  report
Table I summarizes  some general and financial  irAlicators  for European TSEs for which
current data were readily available. The GDP data are for 1990, while data relating to bank assets are
end-90 or for some time in 1991. Note that bank assets reflect  whatever bad loans remain on the books
of the commercial  banks, which is significant  in many TSEs.  Thus the importance  of state banks may
be overstated.  TSE financial  systems usually  are even more concentrated  on the deposit side, given the
uneven distribution of bank branches, a key variable in the ability to mobilize funds.  In short-term
funding of private enterprises, the market in some TSEs is notably more competitive  than the numbers
here indicate. The paragraphs  following  Table I provide thumbnail  descriptions  of the financial  sectors
in five European  TSEs.
Table  1: Indicators  for TSEs
Populion  GDP  Bank  Assets  Private  Banks  Bank  Real  Interest  Credit
(Millions) ($  billions)  (%  of GDP)  (%  of Bank  Concentration  Rates*  Ceilings?
Assets)  (Share  of 5
Largest  banks)
Bulgaria  9  20  130  N.A.  40  negative  Yes
Hunriry  10  33  70  8  90  dispersed"  No
Czechoslovalda  16  43  90-120  1  98  3%  to ?  Yes
Poland  38  69  45  5  58  negative***  Yes
Romania  23  30  60  1  to2  98  -170  Yes
*  Estimates  difficult  due  to sharp  changes  in inflation.
Deposit  rates  range  form  -5%  to -30%;  lending  rates  from  -25%  to +10%
In 1990,  minus  23%  to minus  38%  on  deposks,  minus  8%  on loans.30
j^u1gui . Bulgaria moved  to two-tiered  banking  in stages. The household  sector was traditionally  served
by a State Saving Bank. Foreign financial  transactions  were carried out by the Bulgarian Foreign Trade
Bank, but all other transactions  were handled by branches of the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB). In
1981  Mineral Bank was created, and In 1987  seven new sectoral  banks were established  to provide credit
to the large state enterprises.  The move to two-tiered banking was completed in 1990, when the 59
branches  of BNB  where turned into independent  banks. Since  then three private banks started  operating.
The banks, especially  the previous  branches  of BNB,  are small  in size, under capitalized,  and lack
expertise and experience in commercial banking.  A  large part of  loans are non-performing or
uncollectible. The World Bank SAL reform program includes  the clean up of loan portfolios  through
guaranteeing  of nonperforming  loans, the replacement  of uncollectible  loans by government  bonds, and
the creation  of a bank holding  company to implement
*  a merger  cheme  to decrease  the number  of banks to a small number  of larger banlks  with
branch networks;
*  an institutional  strengthening  program; and
the privatization  of state banks.
A banking  law is near passage in parliament,  and a modern  accounting  system is in the process of being
introduced. Interest rates were raised in 1991  from single digit annual rates to 60-70% for loans, but the
adjustment  from price liberalization  resulted in an inflation  rate of 334% in 1991.
The financial  sector needs a major restructuring, including  resolution  of the non-performing  loan
portfolio  problem, the build-up  of expertise and staff, and a working  clearing  system to provide essential
financial  services.
Czech  and Slovak  Federal Republic.  Early in 1990,  Czechoslovakia  moved  to a two-tiered  banking  system
when  the mono-bank,  Statni Banka, was split into a central  bank of the same name, and two commercial
banks: Kommercni  Banka  in the Czech Republic,  and General  Credit Bank in the Slovak  Republic. There
is little inter-republic  business  and these two banks account  for approximately  80% of total lending. Even
this underestimates  the concentration  of market power since the next two largest commercial banks
Investicni  Banks and Obchodni  Banka  are more seriously  encumbered  with non-performing  (and under-31
performing)  domestic  and foreign  loans. There are two major savings institutions  -one in each Republic
- that (1) make highly  subsidized  loans to households  (about 10-15%  of their portfolios), for which they
receive Government subsidy payments, and  (2)  redeposit their  remaining assets with  the  major
commercial  bank in their Republic. While still a very small part of the banking  system, private banks
and joint ventures with foreign banks are emerging. Citibank opened  a full branch in Prague with $15
million  of capital and Societe Generale Kommercni  Bank is a joint venture between Societe Generale
(75%) and Kommercni  Banka (25%) with a capital  base of about $12 million.
The margin between  lending  and deposit  rates in the commercial  banks is currently  about
10%, which the banks argue is needed  to finance  bad loans.  In addition, the "credit crunch' has been
severe.  Real credit in 1991 is 30% lower than in 1990 and total bank lending is about 5% less than
ceilings  imposed  by Statni Banka. With  the liberalization  of prices in January of 1991, interest  rates were
also largely liberalized. Real short-term  deposit rates are hovering around 3%.  In terms of monetary
policy, the authorities  intend  to seek the gradual phase-out  of administered  credit controls by moving to
an auction process designed  to simulate  a true open market.
The problem of non-performing  or under-performing  debts in Czechoslovakia  is very
difficult to determine with estimates ranging from 2545%  of total bank assets.  Nonetheless, the
Government  is planning to privatize some of the banking sector early in large enterprise privatization
program.
Key problems are high concentration,  a large stock of under-performing  loans, a lack of institutional
support (legal, regulatory, supervisory, licensing,  accounting,  etc.), and a shortage  of well-trained  bank
staff.
lIunglay. Hungary is well ahead of other Eastern European  countries  in reforming its financial  system.
It established  a two-tier banking  system in 1987. There were 30 banks in operation in 1990. Of these,
4 are large state-owned commercial  banks, 3 savings banks, 14 small and medium size banks and 9
specialized  finance  institutes.  Hungary  has made  considerable  progress in introducing  a sound  regulatory
framework, although its robustness  remains  to be tested. Implementation  of many legal and regulatory
reforms is rather slow.  The authorities  have adopted a tight monetary and fiscal stance.  Interest rates32
are freely determined  and there is no recourse to credit ceilings. There is an active market for treasury
bills and an auctioning system for some refinancing facilities.  However, various heavily subsidized
directed credit facilities are also available.  Some of these encourage the development  of the private
sector, though take up of most subsidized  facilities is low.  The securities market has been reopened, a
new securities market law has been passed and various international  investment  banks have established
local offices. These are playing an increasing  role in privatization  and joint ventures.
The big five banks have substantial  state participation,  both direct and indirect  through
other state-owned  companies. Of these, the National  Savings  Bank still dominates  the household  banking
sector, although it has recently expanded into corporate banking.  It accounted  for 36% of total bank
assets in 1990. The four state-owned  large commercial  banks accounted  for 48% of bank assets, while
the small and medium-size  banks represented 14%  of bank assets. However, the small and medium  size
banks provided 28% of short-term credit to the enterprise sector.  They include a number of quite
successful  joint venture banks as well as a number of less active Hungarian  banks that used to operate
as specialized finance institutes but acquired a universal banking license.  Despite the increase in the
number  of banks, there is insufficient  competition  and innovation  and considerable  market segmentation.
The competition  is strongest in providing  working capital, trade finance  and related  services. Long-term
lending has been stagnant. This reflects both reticent supply and weak demand.  Nominal spreads are
quite  high, penalizing  good borrowers. On the other hand, after allowing  for potential  loan losses  as well
as the high level of inflation,  spreads may be inadequate  to prevent an erosion of bank capital adequacy
ratios.
The main problem facing the Hungarian financial system relates to the burden of
contingent  liabilities  emanating  from three sources: the high level of bad loans to state-owned  enterprises
(this has been adversely affected by the collapse of the CM3A trade); the central bank exposure to
foreign  exchange  losses; 2nd the unfunded  liabilities  of the social security (pension) system. Improving
the effectiveness  of supervision  and the institutional  capability  of banks remain pressing issues, although
considerable  progress  has already been made on both fronts.
Poland. Until January of 1989, the mono-bank  system passively  financed  state enterprises as part of the
Government's  plan.  Then, the mono-bank  was split into the National Bank of Poland, which assumed
central banking functions, and nine regionally based commercial  banks.  The Government intends to33
develop a predominantly  private banking  sector, and toward this goal has, as of late 1991, issued over
100  banking licenses, initiated  plans to ready the state-owned  banks for privatization,  and established  a
banking  school In Katowice. Nonetheless,  competition  in the financial  system remains limited: private
banks account for a  very small share of  loans, commercial banks are  heavily specialized, both
geographically  and sectorally.  Only one bank issues international  trade credits, another bank issues
almost all housing loans, one bank receives more than half of domestic  time and savings deposits, while
a different  bank accounts  for sixty percent  of foreign  currency  deposits. The 1989  Banking  Law permits
universal banking, although the precise boundaries  of intermediary behavior and the regulatory and
licensing  infastructure will only be resolved  over time.
The Government's large borrowing requirement  restrains  the expansion  of credit to the
productive  sector. Moreover, about  one-third  of non-govermnent  credit is flowing  to directed/subsidized
sectors and state-owned enterprises absorb over sixty percent of the stock of nongovernment  credit.
Housing  finance represents  the bulk of directed  credit.  Furthermore, the Government  imposed  a grace
period for amortization,  and subsidizes  40% of interest capitalization. This budgetary expense  should
reach USS 1.2 billion in 1992.  Since the public is unlikely  to satisfy fully  these debts, the housing  finance
program  may ultimately  contrioute  to the large non-performing  loan problem. The Government  also has
credit programs for agriculture  and has established  other specialized  lending institutions  to direct credit
allocation.
A substantial  fraction  of loans to state-owned  enterprises  cannot be paid, and these losses
exceed  the net worth  of banks. While difficult  to estimate,  few expect  more than a small fraction  of bank
loans to be paid in full.  The bad loan problem in combination  with limited prudential regulation  has
induced  some bank managers  either to restrict credit excessively  or allocate credit based on past business
ties.
In monetary  policy, Poland has implemented  indirect  control mechanisms  such as NBP
refinancing,  reserve  requirements  and open market  operations, although  the market for NBP bills is still
thin. The Government  plans to remove bank-by-bank  credit ceilings. The NBP has used the refinancing
rate to keep  the interest  rate positive in real terms, and has often provided pguidance"  to N%nkz  in setting
loan and deposit rates.  It is felt that improved competition  and banking skills will promote complete
interest rate liberalization.34
The major problems include (i) the distortion of credit produced by the government
deficit, large specialized  credit programs, and the weak state of bank portfolios; (ii) the combination  of
reserve  requirement  policy, interest  rate controls,  and high inflation,  which imposes  a high tax on banks;
and (iii) inadequate policies on foreign exchange deposits that produce a mismatch between foreign
exchange  assets and liabilities.
Romala.  Romania only moved to a two-tiered banking system in December 1990, and its structure
remains  close to that of the pre-reform  period. There are five state-owned  commercial  banks that account
for most banking  activity: one savings  bank that collects  70% of all deposits and has lent only a fraction
of that amount for low-interest  mortgages; and four "lending  banks" formerly exclusively  concentrated
on foreign  trade finance, long-term  investment  in agriculture  and industry, or short-term  finance. Several
new private banks have opened in the last year, with one constituted out of several hundred small
cooperatives. Still, these institutions  thus far have remained  tiny. As of mid-91, banks  were lendingonly
to private firms and to commercial  companies  -- state firms cut off from budget support; the large state
enterprises,  still tied to the bL  Iget, were getting loans only with the provision  of a government  guarantee.
All of the banks are endowed with "universal"  banking  powers, but thus far have concentrated  on slowly
building  up their branch network (the four state-owned  lending banks plus the private banks' have less
than 5% of the number of branches  of the savings  bark.
In contrast  to many TSEs, the bank losses  appear to be minute now, as the govermment:
first, used government deposits (40% of GDP in 1988)  to wipe out a large share of losses during the
1988-90  period; and second, removed  90% of remaining  estimated  losses  as of July 1991, to be replaced
by government bonds paying a yet-to-be  announced  interest rate.  The system's other main advantage,
aside from the absence  of any significant  foreign debt, is in the form of banking laws, which give the
central bank more statutor, independence  than in most countries and considerable  leeway in crafting
supervisory  regulations.  Although the central bank has deregulated interest rates (except for (during
much of 1991) setting a 3 percentage point limit between the average cost of funds and the average
lending rate of each bank), rates in fact are controlled  by the savings bank, which is the main provider
of funds to the lending banks aiid whose management  has decided -- in part, it maintains,  because of a
physical inability  to adjust rates more than once a year - to hold down the interbank cost of funds to
levels far below the rate of inflation.35
Key problems of the financial sector are: achieving some flexibility of interest rates,
creating competition  in finance, building institutional  capacity within the banks to conduct commercial
lending (credit assessment skills, monitoring capacity, etc.), and cleaning up a large inter-enterpris..,
arrears problem. The latter process began in early 1992  and may entail a sharp increase in credit to the
extent that net arrears are covered by central bank credit.  Also, the non-bank market, primarily
insurance,  is small but growing.
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